The Securitization of Muslims in Europe

Speaker 1 00:00:07 In the just concluded first round of presidential elections in France, president Macron and a far right candidate, Maria Lapan emerged as a top two contenders and will face each other in a runoff. The candidates have employed Islamophobic rhetoric and do not hide their anti Muslim sentiments. How did Islamophobia emerge as a central feature of European politics? Why there little to distinguish between center and far right candidates when it comes to Islam and Muslims, Islam and greets. Welcome to six of Islam on the edges channel of the Madan podcast, a project by the Ali Royal act center for global Islamic studies at George Mason university in Virginia. In this outstanding episode, I host Dr. Far H class of 1955, visiting professor of international studies at Williams college in Massachusetts. In this episode, Dr. HAIs and I discussed the mainstreaming of Islamophobia in European politics. We talk about the neoNazis and their relationship with Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe, Dr. Speaker 1 00:01:15 HAIs traces, European governments attempts to create officially sanctioned versions of Islam. Be they French, German, or Austrian. The control of a Muslim discourse in Europe often leads to the securitization of Muslims. They are viewed through a security lens, either as a security threat or as potential allies in the fight against terrorism. This approach necessarily leads to a good versus bad Muslim that academy in the European mind. Another dimension is the racialization of Muslims in Austria. For instance, there are long standing Muslim communities dating back to the Austria Hungarian empire, primarily from Pasan herd Sevin, which the Austria Hungarians occupied in 1878, as a result of the Muslim in presence, the Austrian state adopted the so-called Islam law in 1912, recognizing Muslims as a religious community within the empire, primarily the goal was to domesticate Basian and Basian Muslims and distance them from the Ottoman state and traditions. Speaker 1 00:02:21 This law that was passed in 9 19 12 was replaced by a new Islam law in 2015, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, Dr. HAIs. And I discussed this and many other issues in this episode and worried about our guest, Dr. Fori ha is, is class of 1955 visiting professor of international studies at Williams college in Williamstown, Massachusetts. He's also a center associate at the bridge initiative at Georgetown university in Washington, DC. Dr. Ha has a PhD in political science from the university of vie, Austria. He's affiliated with several prestigious research centers and universities in the United States and abroad. He's the author of several books in English and German, including Islam related politics in Europe, which is forthcoming with S university press. Dr. HAIs has edited several books and collected volumes and serves as one of the editors of European Islamophobia reports and Islamophobia studies yearbook, a prolific author. He has published close to 100 articles and chapters in various peer review journals and edited volumes. We hope you'll enjoy our discussion FA welcome to our podcast. Speaker 2 00:03:40 Thanks for having me. Speaker 1 00:03:42 Absolutely. It's pleasure. I wanted to start first by asking you a general question. Tell us a little bit about your work researching Islamophobia and anti Muslim discrimination in Europe. Speaker 2 00:03:54 Mm, well, I mean, all of that started basically when, you know, when I was a PhD student in political science band in Vienna and Austria, there was this feeling that was around like 2007 to 2009, that a lot was going on in terms of Islamophobia, but nobody really talked about it. And that's why when, when I felt like there is some need really on behalf of academics to speak out and to analyze and, and to have a discussion on that issue. So that was actually, I mean, the way how I started, uh, becoming interested in that. And that was still, you know, at the time, when, especially in, in, in, in many European continental countries, there was not really a lot of, uh, discussion academic output, whatever on the whole issue of Islamophobia. So my, my PhD was basically very much, I, I was doing a critical discourse analysis on parliamentary debates on the ban of masks and minerals in different, uh, Austrian states. Speaker 2 00:04:53 And, you know, then one thing followed the other. I started the Islamophobia studies yearbook back in 2010. Then in 2015, I became the co-ed leader of a new institution that we established, which was called the European Islamophobia report, which is a collective effort of more than 35 to 40 authors, uh, every year where we not only monitor, but analyze also, uh, what is going on in, uh, in terms of Islamophobia in more than 30 European countries. So that has been inly a since 2015, we now just finishing up the sixth, uh, volume of this annual project. And in 2017, I started working for the bridge initiative at Georgetown university, which is dedicated to understanding and talking about Islamophobia in the, in the public square where I actually at the first time in my life became affiliated to an institution professionally working on Islamophobia because everything else before was basically a hobby. Uh, it was just like my, my personal dedication. Right. And not really being paid for anything of that work that I had been doing so long. Speaker 1 00:05:59 Yeah. That's, that's really good. So now how many of these annual reports have you published? Speaker 2 00:06:03 Well, the Islamophobia studies yearbook, we, um, currently finishing the 12th volume and the European Islamophobia report. That's now the sixth being out. Yeah. Speaker 1 00:06:14 All right. So we can't really talk about Islamophobia. We also talking about the secretization of Muslims in, in Europe in general. So how do different European countries promote the securitization of Islam and Muslims? Speaker 2 00:06:28 Well, I think, um, I mean, in terms of understanding Islamophobia, I think there are different angles from which you can look at the whole issue on one side. I think what is very crucial for understanding the European state of Islamophobia is the rise of the far right, which started already in the eighties, uh, nineties in most Western European countries. And that was very much related to the political parties, trying to find new way of approaching all the problems and also the immigration of people of color into Europe the far, right, when it, when it became more of, let's say a successful political party in electoral terms, that was at the beginning very much tied to the, to a general question of racism and the cultural of socioeconomic problems. And it only turned to become the so-called Muslim problem in the late 1990s. And that then obviously with nine 11, that was an another booster for this movement. Speaker 2 00:07:32 Uh, so I think that's one side of how, how to approach, understanding the position of Muslims today in Europe. The other side, I think is when with nine 11, what happened with the global war on terror is something that we have witnessed even going beyond Europe, what, what you just called the securitization of Muslims. So this whole idea of problematizing Muslim identity, uh, as being something of a security threat and approaching the whole issue of Islam, Muslims, not from the angle of freedom of religion, but rather of internal security and therefore, you know, creating all of this vocabulary of radicalization extremism, and, uh, uh, subsequently also introducing a lot of legislation that is actually targeting Muslims through the lens of the security threat, obviously that also intermingles with issues of religion politics. And I think that's the interesting thing if, you know, from an, from a us American perspective where you have a secular understanding of a full separation of state and religion, the European perspective might look a little bit awkward because in U in European countries, though, there are different regulations of the relationship of state and, and church or religion in most of the countries. Speaker 2 00:08:55 If we leave aside France as a, a very exception of this more, uh, European way of how to deal with religion and politics, you do have in many countries, legally recognized churches and denominations, right? So there is not a full separation in the American sense of church UR state power, but there is a way of a cooperation between state authorities and religions. And that's especially the case for countries like Germany, Austria, and others, where we speak of the cooperative model. That's how it's called by legal scholars. Then obviously also have some countries where the state and the religion is one and the same, right? Like the British model, for instance, but in terms of the Muslim issue, I think what is interesting here is that from 2000 5, 6, 7 on, we could observe a tendency where European states basically tried to create their own domestic form of Islam. Speaker 2 00:09:54 So we, we had the French Islam, which also McClean now is pushing very hard for the Dutch Islam, the German Islam, Italian Islam, whatever Islam, and the, the authority that was mainly behind these efforts was the ministry of interior in all of these cases. So you could clearly see that while let's say the Catholic church or the Protestant church, or the Jewish community is approached by mostly the culture of, uh, the ministry of cultural affairs when it comes to the Muslim issue, it's the ministry of interior. And that shows you very much where this ver is journey, uh, started and where it's going. Right. Um, it's again, through the lenses of security, uh, looking at Muslims through the lenses of a security threat and at the very same time, trying to create a domesticated version and in a way disciplining Muslims to be in a way as I would call it observant, if not submissive subjects, that basically do not question any thing that is going on in these countries. So, so I, I think that is the way how I would put it. Speaker 1 00:11:03 Yeah, that's very interesting. And you mentioned the rise of the far right in Europe, and obviously that also happened in Austria. So can you tell us since you are from Austria and you come from that country, can you tell us a little bit about the rise of the far right in Austria and the most recent issues surrounding securitization of Islam in Austria, including for instance, Kurtz, who was, um, I understand is at the end of his political life, at least for now, tell us a bit about the rise, his rise in politics, and how did that impact Muslims? Speaker 2 00:11:36 Well, I mean, uh, Austria, I think in, is in very, in many senses, uh, a very interesting case. Why, because on one side, Austria was the first country back then in the EU 15, when the European union had 15 member states only were, we had a far right political party becoming part of a co a coalition government. And if we think back, like we, we remember what happened then was that actually the other EU 14 member states boycotted Austria for that reason. So we can see like 20 years back, they, they won the elections. They became the second, uh, largest party in 1999 and formed the coalition government in 2000. So 20 years ago, having a foreign right party, even being part of the power structures was, was unbelievable. Right. How could Austrians just do that? So, I mean, this whole boycot that it did not last, uh, for more than a few months, but nevertheless, this reaction was so different to what we are witnessing today. Speaker 2 00:12:43 Right? We, we have, uh, like 17 years later, we had a minister of interior and vice chancellor, vice prime minister, uh, uh, a prime minister S in, in Italy, we had the far right again in Austria and in so many other countries, uh, the far right was part and parcel of the, of the new normal political landscape. So Austria in that case is interesting because it definitely had a pioneering role in mainstreaming and normalizing the far right in everyday politics. So that's one aspect. The other aspect, I think, which is also interesting in a, in a more international politics perspective is <inaudible> who was the famous leader of the far ride in Austria when his party became a part of the coalition, he, as a person was not allowed to enter Israel. Why? Because obviously for the Israeli, uh, state, he was linked historically speaking to the Nazi system. Speaker 2 00:13:41 So because the far right party, the, the, the freedom party is at the end of the day, uh, when it was established, it was nothing else. But, uh, the representation of the X Nazis, it was a party for X Nazis from ex Nazis. So that's also, I think, a very interesting shift that we could see, because again, 10 years later, a lot of far right, parties would align themselves with Israel. They would have official visits to Israel. So this mainstream of the far right also happened at the backdrop. A lot of Islamophobia. Why? Because the strategic shift that the far right made was from the, in the eighties, nineties, you had a lot of far right parties saying like very bla antisemitic stuff in the public. And that was also one of the problems that the far right had, because the, you know, the whole image that they represented was like, these are old fascists. Speaker 2 00:14:43 Nobody really wants to vote for them. But then when, when they made this strategic shift to changing from an antisemitic profile to an Islamophobic profile, and also connecting Islamophobia too, like we are defending multicultural Europe or LGBTQ I community, or the Jewish community, you know, that really helped the far right to become a successful political party in various European countries. And I think on another note, this also helped actually to align those far right parties with the Republican party in the United States. Because again, if we go back 20 years ago, no Republican politician would align himself, would drink, have a cuff in the public. We're the far right guy. Now, when Trump was in power, that was the gold age of the far, right. When you had all of these alignments Israel, the European far, right. And the Republican party in the United States. So you can really see through the lens, uh, looking through the history of Islamophobia, how that really shifted the whole political landscape, even on a global scale. Speaker 2 00:15:55 So again, going back to Austria and the rise of the far right, one of the things that happened was, and you can trace that really back, like, uh, in, in, in the party platforms and, and the policies that were implemented, what, what happened was that the Centris right parties, and this is what said courts represent the Austrian people's party, which is a Christian democratic, uh, Centris right party. They basically co-opted step by step. The policy claims the Islamophobic policy claims of the far right. And this is, uh, what we could clearly see in Austria where the far right actually did not start implementing and at opting an anti Muslim platform after nine 11, but rather after 2005, when they split from the government. So the time they were not anymore in charge of governmental politics, and they went back into opposition, that was the, really the date when they, uh, decided we are gonna run on an anti Muslim platform. Speaker 1 00:16:54 Islamophobia actually helped them to move from the far right to the center. And in a way, Islamophobia was centered as one of the main political platforms of even the mainstream political parties in, in Austria. Is that what you're saying? Speaker 2 00:17:09 Yeah. And that, that happened, let's say 10 years later, around 10 years later. But I, I think there is a crucial difference between the centrist, right. Adopting Islamophobia and the far right. Because the far right, you know, most of the far right folks, they are marginal political parties. Most of the time, they're not in a position of responsibility because they are not in government. Their idea of how to deal with Muslims is very superficial. They basically saying we wanna have them out, just bring them out of the country, but that's not a realistic option. Right. Cause in most European countries, as in, in this, the case in Austria, a large part of the Muslim population has citizenship. So you can't just like kick them out of the country. So the C stride has a different take on that. Their idea is not to chase Muslims outta the country, but rather their idea is to change what Islam means for Muslims. Speaker 2 00:18:08 What they did is on one side, they built institutions, you know, they like pushed for Islamic theology departments at state universities, uh, creating new institutions to create a whole discourse around what the future of Islam should look like in many ways, the way they presented that was not like we are against Muslims. It's like we wanna save Muslims from the bad ones. Yeah. So it was a clever way how even to approach that in the public, they could not be like criticized for yeah. You are against Islam as such. No, because the way they presented it was in a way a liberal, uh, uh, framing of, of their Islamophobia. So, um, what they did, and I think, you know, in an, in analytical, uh, terms, what they stand for is basically a way to create a European notion of Islam. Um, and that again has a very long colonial history, right. Speaker 2 00:19:09 We know at like for most of the colonial empires, even though those Muslims were not in Europe, they would speak of, yeah, you have to Ize your Islam, which basically means for them don't have any political opposition, uh don't question, our state or the art don't question, our power structures be submissive, uh, citizens. And, and then we find as long as you, as you don't question anything, you are good citizens. Yeah. And that's what we want from you also, I mean, honestly speaking that works in a lot of European countries, because a lot of Muslim institution that would, they would also say, okay, let us live. We gonna let, let you live. Uh, and we fine, right. Don't need to mingling to our affairs, but I think the project or the, or the C right. Even goes further in that they really wanna change, uh, like in, even in theological terms, they wanna create their own version of Islam. And I think that's really the dangerous pots of that. Speaker 1 00:20:06 Yeah. So, so the state intervenes in that whole process and projects itself fully into the theological conversation of what Islam is and should be and uses all of these new initiatives like opening, like you said, theological departments and faculties or trainings for Iams and teachers and whatnot in order to say, this is the state approved version of Islam, which you can teach publicly. This is the good, the right Islam that is acceptable within this context. Right. And the state defines what that is. That's really fascinating now <inaudible>, you know, that our channel is called Islam on the edges. And Austria had been just outside the edges of traditional Islam, as you know, of course going all the way back to the, you know, the Sija Vienna and all of that, and the history that it had, and then because of its proximity to the Oman empire and with the collapse of the Omans and the retreat from Europe, some of the areas that were heavily populated by Muslims came under the Aminian of the Austria Austral Hungarian empire. Right. And that necessitated creation of first laws in Austria on Islam. So can you tell us a little bit about that? I know you researched it even had a grant with our center on this particular topic. So maybe tell us a little bit about when did that happen and, and, and, and how did that law accommodate Muslims and Islam within the Austria Hungarian empire? Speaker 2 00:21:34 I mean, I think that's a fascinating, uh, story because a lot of people are not aware of that, as you're saying it's on the edges, right. It's also interesting in, in so many other ways, because even the way, how Muslims today in Austria, especially BOS Muslims of Boian origin, which are like around 20, more than 20% of the whole Muslim population in ethnic terms, they also, their imagination of the role of the Bosnians within this whole Austrian construction of Islam is very interesting. So let me start with, I mean, obviously when the Austrian Hungarian empire occupied Bosnia and her Sego in 1878, they took the lands where you had the majority, uh, or a large group of Muslims living there. I mean, the immediate reaction was obviously because Bosnia was back then still part of the Ottoman empire before. And so these lands were given with the Austrians because of the Berlin conference. Speaker 2 00:22:32 What happened was that the Bosnian Muslims, obviously they fought the Austrian Hungarian empire. There were more than 150,000 Bosnian Muslims that even fled to the Ottoman empire, because for them it would not be doable to resign in place, which is not on the Muslim rule. That's what that was their perspective back then. Right. And one of the interesting aspects in terms of the religion politics was obviously that the religious authority was tied to the Ottoman empire. It was tied to the caliphate, right. And what the Austrians wanted at the beginning was to say, okay, well, symbolically, you can still align yourself with the OTO, but in structural terms, you are under our control. And that is what the Austrian empire managed actually over the, the, the course over the next decades, uh, managed to fulfill, put everything under Austrian control. So although they, they accepted the people that were elected to become the highest religious authorities. What the Austrians wanted is that this is done formally under the governance of the, of the empire. And they succeeded in that. I mean, there was so Speaker 1 00:23:51 In a way, the, the empire of the Austral empire became the new Cali for the Muslims <laugh> Speaker 2 00:23:57 Yeah. In a way, in a way. So, as it was called in, in Bosnia, mm-hmm <affirmative>, uh, so what we have all in the Catholic church, right? So it's like the Pope gives you the allowance to become the Cardinal or a Bishop or whatever that happened now should happen, not with the, with the Cali, but rather with the Austria Australian Hungarian empire. So, I mean, there were a lot of struggles also between different Muslim, uh, camps within, within Boston Hexa GOBA enough. But I think what, what is really crucial then for the Austrian side of the history is in 1909, you had a way of legally recognizing this Muslim community that led to the, uh, so-called Islam act of 1912, uh, shortly before the first world war break broke out. What is interesting with that is because of the Islam act of 1912, and because then the first Republic, and then the second Republic in 1945, basically incorporated all of this religious, uh, religion law, uh, which was part and parcel also of the liberalization of the religious infrastructure, because it was not an only anymore the Catholic church that was dominant in the, in the Hoppo monarchy. Speaker 2 00:25:11 But you also had the legal recognition of the Jewish community of smaller, uh, Christian churches, especially also of the Protestant churches. So you had a diversification of illegal recognition of different churches and religious societies and the Muslims basical one amongst them. So the interesting thing is here that this helped Muslims after 1945 to go back to this, uh, legal framework and say, okay, we are part and parcel of this history, right? We are legally recognized. So please give us an, uh, an ability here to structure ourselves in order to be also again, legally recognized as it used to be back in the Hoppo monarchy. And, and I, I mean, that, that's interesting in many ways, because on one side you did not have any other European countries post 1945 post world war II world, where Islam was legally recognized like you, then, then, uh, I think you had the, the case also in Belgium and in Spain to some extent, but in Western Europe, Austria was actually a unique case. Speaker 2 00:26:19 So what happened the, the first Muslim immigration basically started with Bosnian Muslims who fled the communist regime in the 19 late 1940s and fifties. And then you had, uh, the, uh, immigration coming from Turkey in the sixties. So what these populations did, and obviously, which should also not be for forgotten is, uh, a lot of Arab Muslim students who came, uh, with the independence and, and the post-colonial states after the 1950s. So those Muslims were the ones who then reorganized the Muslim community based on the Islam act of 1912. So what happened was that Bruno Christ, the a long time social democratic chancellor, uh, who had a lot of French up with a lot of the Muslim world, he was the first to give the P uh, an embassy in, in the world, right in, back in Vienna. The OPAC was, uh, got their headquarters also in Vienna. Speaker 2 00:27:14 So there was a lot of soft diplomacy going on, uh, between Austria and the Muslim world. So they realized the Islam act could help us. So that's why in 1979, they then recognized the Islamic religious society based on the Islamic act of 1912. And that actually helped Muslims a lot to reorganize themselves and give themselves a status, a equivalent to a lot of other religious, uh, societies and churches. What I is interesting in terms of, uh, the Bosnian history is on one hand, even the far right recognized that Bo Bosnian white, and I think that's really important, white Muslims, European Muslims, they had kind of a special status and they were regarded as you know, on one hand, they are the moderate Muslims, the girl Muslims, and, you know, that's also how they shifted then their discourse when they became anti-Muslim, they were not necessarily anti-Muslim being anti Bosnian, white Muslims, but rather in being anti-immigrant, you know, black, brown, black, and brown Muslims. Speaker 1 00:28:20 So there is racialization taking place also. Speaker 2 00:28:22 Absolutely. So I think that that really also helped, uh, the far right, you know, to have a, a bit also of a nuance perspective on, on how they deal with these issues. But, you know, at the same time, this helped them in questioning the whole status of Muslims in Austria, because their, their argument in 2008, when they published a major position paper on the role of Muslims in Austria, they would say, we should not give the status of Bosnian native European Muslims to the others. So basically Speaker 1 00:28:59 It's almost like Islam act of 1912 should apply only to Bosnian Muslims because they are outstanding European and all of these like newcomer, Muslims, they should be treated differently. Is that what it is? Speaker 2 00:29:12 Yeah. That was their core argument. And, and what happened was that when the, when the century strike coopted this agenda and they, uh, implemented a new Islam act in 2015, that they actually fully restructured the whole relationship between, uh, the state authorities and the Muslim community in a way that is not existing in with any other church or religious or religious community. Speaker 1 00:29:43 Yeah. So I, I wanted to ask you about that. So we had that 1912 Islam act in Austria, which travel served as a foundation for later Muslim presence in the country where they could say, look, we've been recognized. We just want our rights. It's part of the Austrian law. But then, then, uh, the state almost felt as if that law was maybe too generous to Muslims, or maybe they wanted new interventions. So tell us about this more recent law on, on Islamic communities in Austria and why it created such controversy. Speaker 2 00:30:20 Yeah, I mean was a lot to say about this law because I mean, it had, first of all, it has a lot of articles and, uh, sure. Paragraphs, so we could have like a whole session about that. But I think, you know, I mean to put it in a nutshell, I think the really, really the two dramatic shifts that we could see, which seemed to some people and it in a way paradox even. But I think it makes pretty much sense for the whole new generation of leadership for the Austrian leadership with Sebastian quotes, but also for the Muslim leadership with new people coming into power there, what happened was two things on one hand, the state grew in its or, and its possibility to intervene vis Avi, the Islamic religious society. So the Islamic act of 2015 gave the state a lot more powers to have a say in the agendas of the Islamic authority should to give you a few examples. Speaker 2 00:31:20 The chancellor has the power to dissolve any legal entity of the Islamic religious community. So he does not have the power to do that with any church or any other religious community. So everything that has to be changed, for instance, if, if, if, uh, the constitution, which is an internal affair of the Islamic religious authority, it be changed. It has to be accepted by the chancellor. So that is a direct intervention, uh, uh, power of intervention he has. So that's one thing. So strengthening the position of the state VI Avita community. On the other hand, what also happened is prior to 2015, most of the Muslim communities were organized based on the law of association, which is not related to any religious, uh, legislation. So it's like every citizen or non-citizen even in Austria has the right to form an association. Speaker 1 00:32:22 All right. So it's something like nonprofit in United States. Yeah. Speaker 2 00:32:25 A nonprofit organization. And it's very easy in Austria to do so. You have to have two people, you have to have a constitution, that's it. So what happened was with the Islamic act of 2015, Muslims could only establish associations, religious associations, not anymore on the law, based on the law of association, but only on the Islam act of 2015, which at the very same time also implied that if they do so they are under the governance of the Islamic religious. So the Islam act on one hand strengthened the state authorities Vivi the Muslim community. And at the same time, on the other hand, it also strengthened the power of the Islamic religious society Vivi every single Muslim NGO Speaker 1 00:33:17 Mm-hmm <affirmative>. So when you say Islamic religious society, is that sort of a formal body that exists in, in yeah. Speaker 2 00:33:22 That's formal body. That's like a church it's in a way Muslim church. Yeah. Speaker 1 00:33:27 It's like the Islamic community of Boston, her, right. Speaker 2 00:33:29 Absolutely. Speaker 1 00:33:30 Something like that. The official, the official organization. Speaker 2 00:33:34 Yeah. I think that, you know, what, what is really problematic is what we've been speaking about four is, you know, this idea of creating this domestic version of Islam. Mm-hmm, <affirmative> trying really to put everything under one umbrella, it's like, there is no more freedom. <laugh> okay. Mm-hmm <affirmative> and another aspect of the Islam act was also to not allow financial support on a continuous level to happen from outside of Austria. So it was a way of trying to Deconnect the Austrian Muslim community from the rest of the global Muslim community. Mm-hmm <affirmative> while this is obviously not happening with the Catholics who are the Catholic church that is connected to the Veryan to the Protestant church and every other religious community, which is always global. Right. That's what they really achieved with the Islam act of 2015, disconnecting them formally financially in terms of human resources and so on and so forth from the rest of the Muslim community, Speaker 1 00:34:33 The nationalization of the Muslims in a way. Speaker 2 00:34:35 Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. Speaker 1 00:34:37 So tell us a bit about the reaction by different Muslim communities in Austria to that, to that new law. Speaker 2 00:34:43 Well, I mean, um, me as a, uh, as a person who always, uh, writes about these issues and speaks about that, I, I obviously became a strong critic of this act beyond also, I mean, publishing academic pieces on that, but I also like spoke out in the public, you know, on TV interviews, et cetera. What we could see is that the protest against this new act primarily came from the younger generation. And initially the leadership of the Islamic religious authority was even in support of this Islamic act. Why? Because it gave them more power, right. Vis Avi, the Muslim NGO world. Speaker 1 00:35:26 Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. They gain more power. So for, for that generation, it's probably something positive, right? From that point of view. Speaker 2 00:35:35 And that's created a whole new dynamic in, in, within the Muslim community because the, the protest really grew. And then also that created so much pressure on, uh, the, the leadership of the religiou, uh, Islamic religious, uh, society that they basically formally also had to protest and the act, which they were actually in charge of also Cora coauthoring, right. Initially. Um, but at the end of the day, they accepted the act. And I mean, one of the issues was also that the Islamic act of in 1912 only related to the Islamic religious society, the Islamic act of 2015 would govern every Islamic religious society that would also potentially be established in the future. So it, in a way also it weakened the, the unique position of the Islamic religious society. That was an important renewal a while, because what happened was after 2015, a number of legislations were implemented by the OT government. Speaker 2 00:36:38 You had the full face whale ban in 2017, the, the hijab ban in 2018, the closure of mosques in the name of fighting political Islam, which were actually part of the Islamic religious community society. So a lot of legislations were brought through. And, and I think all of that could only happen with the Islamic act of 2015 because the Islamic act of 2015 weakened, basically the position of the Islamic's, uh, religious society, Vivi state authorities before 2015, whenever the government, the Austrian state would put in place, any legislation that touches upon Muslim in the public sphere, they had to go back to the Islamic religious society and ask them for their consent. That was not anymore the case in after 2015. So in a way, it weakened their position so dramatically that a lot of these anti Muslims legislations could even be put in place. Speaker 1 00:37:37 So the state then became the ultimate arbiter on what is Islamic and what is acceptable and what is not, if I, if I'm understanding correctly. Speaker 2 00:37:47 Yes. But it also diversified it, the authority of what is Islamic and what not mm-hmm <affirmative> because then with the Islamic of 2015, also the Islamic society was governed under this act. So you had two voices of what Islam is, and potentially there can be a third or fourth or fifth, because this was also one of the new aspects of this amendment. Speaker 1 00:38:14 So you mentioned earlier after that law, in 2015, you mentioned that there was an attempt and, uh, by the government to combat what it called, political Islam and Muslim extremism. Can you tell us how did that happen after that 2015 law and what exactly was the government targeting? Yeah, Speaker 2 00:38:36 Well, um, I think the roots of this story actually go back to the protest against the Islamic act, because what happened was when the Islamic act was discussed in the, in the public and the, and the protest grew enormously, is that the guy government, or let's better say the conservative part of the government, Sebastian courts and his team, they started the whole campaign against so-called political Islam that basically targeted all of those who protested, like even people like me. So the idea was political Islam is kind of the bad that we also have to kind of protect the, the rest of the Muslim community from, and it has never been defined. And I think that was one of the strength also of this whole notion and how they could mobilize, uh, so much on this, uh, idea of fighting political Islam, because nobody really knew what, what political Islam it was. Speaker 2 00:39:36 I give you just one example. I mean, when the hijab, uh, was banned in school, which actually, uh, later was resigned by the constitutional court, but at the moment when it was legitimized and, and implemented, this was done by arguing. This is to fight political Islam when several masks were closed. That was again, legitimized by saying that was a symbol of political Islam. So you could see in, in, I mean, in, in the policies that were implemented, be it legislation be different measures that were all tied to this combat against political Islam, political Islam actually stands for a variety of things. It stands for organized Muslims. It stands for visibility of Islam in the public square. It stands for outspoken critique. And I think all of these aspects you could argue is what represents political Islam for the centrist, right. Politics. Speaker 1 00:40:37 Yeah. So we've zoomed in, on Austria in this last part of our conversation. And obviously for the reasons that, uh, you know, that are understandable, you are from Austria, you know, the situation so well. And I think our listeners will find it fascinating or, or this conversation let's now zoom out a little bit and look at the rest of, of Europe. Do you find in other countries in Europe, uh, similar things happening, what are some of the potential state controlled policies that could adversely impact Muslims in those countries? Where do you find this is the most difficult for the Muslims and on the other also maybe are there places in Europe where Muslims are free from these kind of interferences? Speaker 2 00:41:25 I mean, though, we have no ranking of like, who's the most Islamophobic country in our European Islamophobia report. Um, and Speaker 1 00:41:33 There's strong competition, right? Speaker 2 00:41:34 <laugh> yeah. Uh, I would definitely say, I mean, I think one of the most horrible countries to live in is definitely France. And I think one of the most relaxed countries is maybe Portugal. And as a matter of fact, I mean, we always do like, uh, on an annual level. I mean, I hope maybe it's some listeners are, uh, specialized in Portugal, but, you know, we always do like a call for applications in order to, for, for the authoring of, of our country report every year. And it's most difficult to find somebody for Portugal and because even the people I'm from Portugal say like, oh, you know, there is not so much really to talk about <laugh> when it comes to this long phobia. I mean, so there is a long colonial legacy, right. But a lot of, of the structures there, you can find there, but still, yeah. Speaker 2 00:42:21 I mean, coming back, like seriously to your question, there is definitely a number of countries that are not only interested in implementing those policies on a domestic level, the Islamophobic, but they're really interested in making this, the new mainstream for Europe. And you can see that very obviously with formal alliances, you know, just a few weeks ago or a month ago, pardon me? Uh, there was a conference happening in Vienna, which was called the Vienna forum, tackling the, the combat against political Islam and the countries that were, I think, are, are those countries who are, who also stand for these and represent these kinds of policies. Number one, France, there was a high profile, a participation, uh, from the ministry of interior. Um, then there was Denmark with the minister of education. And I would also include maybe Germany to some extent, but in a different way. Speaker 2 00:43:15 Um, obviously, I mean, the crackdown on the Muslim civil society, the way that we witnessed it in Austria with the raids that happened in autumn 2020, that also happened, uh, in France. Um, after the murder of Sam, Patite not only a lot of masks were rated, but also the most important, uh, one of the most important anti-Muslim racist, civil society, organizations, C C I F collective Contra Islamophobia, France, which is the collective against Islamophobia and France, and which monitors Islamophobia had to be closed, right. Uh, by the ministry of interior, uh, alongside also other old organizations. So I think in turn of the crackdown on Muslim civil society, Austrian France are really the, the, the, the pioneering institutions in, uh, in respect to this issue. Then also the GTO laws that we, that you have in, in Denmark, there are a lot of policies that have been implemented in recent times in the last two, three years that I think are, are very alarming, not only to, to Muslims in specific because they are primarily, and at this point of time targeting Muslims. Speaker 2 00:44:23 But I think also in the way that this is questioning the whole idea of freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, a lot of these policies, once they're implemented and tackling Muslims tomorrow, they can be expanded. And, and, and that was one of the things that I think we could also see very much in Austria. You know, when chancellor could back, then he's not chancellor anymore, but when he abolished one of the Protestant holidays, his reaction in public was, you know, Protestants are only a three to 4% of the whole population. He, he just said, doesn't matter for a lot of people. You, you can see like this idea of freedom of religion, protecting minorities. There is no notion of this anymore. Cuz once you go against the weed cast community, the Muslims, tomorrow you go after the second weakest and then you can go forth, uh, to one community and go after one community after the other. Speaker 2 00:45:21 So yeah, I think there is this formal Alliance of definitely of France in Austria, also with Denmark. And I think Germany is playing a crucial role here. It will be interesting to see how that develops now after 16 years of governance of the Christian democratic union, when we now have a social democratic chancellor. But I think a lot of the policies that were implemented in Germany are actually very similar, but the Germans just did it in a more clever way. And they did not have to fear such a fear and mobilized reaction as it happened in Austria. And that's why they just did not became so infa for that. Mm-hmm <affirmative> but I think in many ways, a lot of the theology departments actually fulfilled the best wishes of those dreams of, of state authorities trying to create their own domestic version of Islam of German Islam. Speaker 1 00:46:12 So, so far you've talked mostly about Western and Northern Europe mm-hmm <affirmative>, but there is also emerging Alliance in central Eastern Europe, you know, with countries like Hungary and Slovakia and others, Victor Aban seem to be one of the people who is really gathering around himself, uh, Islam folks. And in terms of central Eastern Europe, what is interesting to me me is that the language seems to be a little bit different, but the aims in the objectives seem to be the same, which is to say that they're talking about demographic challenges to Europe, for instance, which obviously 99% of the time refers to Muslims. Right. So can you comment on that as well on what's going on in social Eastern Europe? Speaker 2 00:46:52 Sure. I think you're absolutely right because, uh, a lot of, especially Eastern European countries, that something, a lot of people did not have any clue about it. And I remember when we started the European Islamophobia report and including all these Europe, uh, Eastern, uh, countries that was actually very new to the whole debate. Why? Because obviously in many of these countries, I mean, if we put aside those countries where you have larger native Muslim communities, like in Bulgaria or in Bosnia, obviously Muslims make like 0.0 something of a percentage of the whole population. So they are like nonexistent, right? There's really small communities. But obviously what happened in after 2014, 15 when civil war happened in Syria, Iraq, and you had a lot of influx of immigrants, there was a huge mobilization of these leaders, political leaders who were not from the far right, who were centrist right. Speaker 2 00:47:49 Or Centris left, who said like, we, we can't have cities like Brussels or London or, or, or Colan, we don't wanna have those Muslims in here. Right. That was the discourse. And I think on one hand it allowed them to keep in power by mobilizing these fears and to not give any space to any far right political party that would think of mobilizing as strong as they had already become in Western Europe. I think that was one of the main strategies behind that. The other thing is, I think that's also very problematic here, obviously because the east of Europe also means the border of the Eastern side of the European union. What we are witnessing these days in Poland, what we also also witnessed in Hungary, keeping immigrants outside with the most violent means that is also reproducing this idea of Europe being a Christian White continent. Speaker 2 00:48:46 And trying also not only not it in any, any of those people, but it's actually also a rewriting of the idea of what the rights of refugees are. A lot of European politicians from central Europe, starting with Austrian, the country I'm coming from, but also Eastern Europe. They actually, I mean publicly discussed if we should not, uh, get out of the J an Eva convention and rethink the whole idea of rights of refugees. And I think that's, that's again, a sign of a very authoritarian tendency that, uh, should be an alarm to all those more democratic fractions within Europe, European society. And again, I, I think the Austrian chancellor, Sebastian Kutz played a crucial role in mobilizing the Eastern European countries and even trying to become kind of a leader of this more authoritarian camp within the European union. And that's, again, I think something that is, uh, very problematic in the whole development of where the European union is heading to. I mean, currently they, they, they are not the most powerful camp, but still, I think it's, it's a problematic development. Speaker 1 00:50:00 Well, thank you so much for, for this wonderful, fascinating if sobering conversation about Islam in Europe, it's a topic that is past obviously most of our conversation focused on Austria, uh, but what is happening there is also emblematic of what is going on much of the rest of Europe. So I really thank you for dedicating your time to being our guest. And I hope that at some point in future, we'll revisit these topics and hopefully in, in, in better conditions for, for Muslims in Europe. Speaker 2 00:50:33 Well thank you for having me. It was an honor. Speaker 1 00:50:36 Absolutely. You have listened to the sixth episode of Islam on the edges of the Madan podcast of Hollywood, a global center for Islamic studies at George. Thank you so much for listening and please join us again. Speaker 0 00:51:07 <silence>.